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COMMENTS
MARR I E1) WOMEN'S ACKNOWI.EDGVI ENTS
IN FLORIDA
Many Florida practitioners today are reluctant to give up the timehonored custom of taking the wife and a notary into a separate room.
apart from the husband, in order to obtain her acknowledgment to a
conveyance of real property "free from his coercion or undue influence,"
despite the enactment of a statute in 1943 abolishing the necessity for
such separate acknowledgments.'
Sec.

693.03,

Fla. Stat.

1941, Laws

1943,

c.

21746,

par. 1:

"The

acknowledgment by a married woman of deeds, conveyances, mortgages,
relinquishments of dower, contracts for the sale of lands, powers of
attorney and other instruments shall be necessary to entitle any such
instrument to be recorded, but no private examination separate from the
husband of such married woman shall be necessary for any purpose, and
the acknowledgment of such instrument by a married woman shall not
constitute any part of the execution of any such Instrument. Any form
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Apparently this statute has left not only many members of the Florida
bar with the feeling that the Legislature had done something which could
riot be done, but some of our courts as well. Actually, the ceremony of
separate acknowledgment, far from being one of the ancient institutions
Of the common law, is a creature of statute and did nlot come into
existence until the nineteenth century.'
Originally a ferne covert, with or without the consent arnd concurrence of her husband, could not convey ary estate of which she was
seized either in her own right or through her inchoate right of dower.
Thus the common law declared the wife to be incapable of making a
conveyance. In order to evade this prohibition the collusive proceeding
of fine and recovery was devised.' Because this proceeding threw wide
the doors to frauds of many kinds, the fine and recovery was barred by
statute,4 and the practice of conveying by joint deed of hirsband and wife
arose,' with, however, the statutory restriction being imposed that the
deed of conveyance must be acknowledged by the wife in a private
examination.'
From 1835 until 1943 the laws of Florida were zealous in the protection afforded the wife from the supposed dishonesty and corruption of
the husband. In Florida. the statute in force until 1943 required by its
terms not only a privy examination but a long recital of non-compulsion.'
It may thus be seen that the abolition of the separate acknowledgment
is rothing more or less than the repeal of a statute of comparatively
recent origin inan effort to sweep away another archaic legal procedure
and adjust our lau to the realities of present-day economic and social
conditions.
Prior to 1943 the married woman's acknowledgment was essential
to the validity of the instrument insofar as her separate estate or dower
right was concerned.' With the enactment of the new statute, the
tjtestor arises as to the present day legal effect of the married woman's
;,cknowledgment.
To better answer this question it is necessary to examine briefly tie
history of the acknowledgment. This is another ceremony unknowrl to
of certificate of acknowledgment which is sufficient in the ease of an
acknowledgment by a single person shall be sufficient in the case of an
acknowledgment by a married woman .. "
' Stat. 3 & 4 William TV, c. 74 (1833); Act. Feb. 4, 1835, par. 1 (Fla.);
Ndeholl v. Jones, 2 H. & M. 588 (1865), Kerr v. Russell, 69 T31. 666, 18 Am.
Rep. 634 (1873); Williams v. Paine, 169 U.S. 55 (1897).
' Newnan v. Equitable, etc., 119 Fla. 641, 160 So. 745 (1935): Martin
v. Dwelly, 6 Wend. (N.Y.) 9, 21 Am. Dee. 245 (1830).
I See. 689.08 Fla. Stat. 1941; Stat. 3 & 4 William IV, e. 74. But bee
Inre Hester's Estate (Fla.) 28 So. (2d) 164 (1946).
Scott v. Fairlie, 81 Fla. 438, at 446, 89 So. 128 (1921).
See. 693.03, Fla. Stat. 1941 prior to 1943 amendment.
Ibid, The statute required a recital "that she executed the same
freely and voluntarily and without compulsion, constraint, apprehension
or fear of or from her husband."
I Ibid.
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the comnon law. It was developed as a result of the passage of the
Statute of Enrollments, which required the enrolling clerk to have
evidence that the instrument produced had in fact been executed.' This
gave rise to the practice of having the grantor acknowledge his deed
before some authorized officer. The acknowledgment, however, was
required only for the purpose of affording proof of due execution of the
instrument in 'order to permit the recordation thereof in the public
records.'0 The acknowledgment had reference solely to proof of execution and not to the force, effect or validity of the instrument. This is
the law of Florida today,'
The acknowledgment itself is not necessary for the actual conveyanc
of real property. It is only a prerequisite to the recording of the instrument in the public records."
However, this view of acknowledgments was not accepted in Florida
with respect to the acknowledgments of married women, for tile statute
in force until 1943 required the separate acknowledgment of the martied woman in order to make her conveyance effective.'
Unless there
was such an acknowledgment the deed was a nullity: so far as the estate
ol the married woman was concerned.'
The 1943 statute changed this rule and by its terms gave the married
woman's acknowledgmeint the same status as the ackncwledgment of
any other person, to-wit: the acknowledgment serves only as a prerequisite to recordation, and no longer constitutes "any part of the
execution of any such instrumnent.
It is therefore logical to assume that since the passage of the 1943 act
tie mere joinder of the wife with her husband in the execution of
ainy instrument ilnolving real estate is sufficient to pass title to all their
interests therein, including the wife's separate estate and dower, or to
otherwise bind the parties in accordance with the terms of the instrument.
Unfortunately, however, this conclusion is upset by an unexpected
recent holding of the Florida Supreme Court."' The action involved a
suit for specific performance of a contract to convey realty. The Court
in a five-two decision held that the contract could not be etiforcel
27 Henry VIII c. 16 (1536).
See Catlin v. Washburn, 3 Vt. 25, at p. 36.
Sec. 689.01, Fla. Stat. 1941; Marsh v. Bennett, 49 Fla. 186, 38 So.
237 (1905); Harris v. Zeuch, 103 Fla. 183, 137 So. 135 (1931).
2
Sec. 695.03, Fla. Stat. 1941. It must be remembered, however, that
the instrument will not be effective as to creditors and subsequent purchasers without notice unless the instrument is recorded. See. 695.01,
la. Stat. 1941.
" Sec. 693.03, Fla. Stat. 1941 prior to 1943 amendment.
"
Adams v. Malloy, 70 Fla. 491, 70 So. 463 (1915), quoting See. 693.03.
Fla. Stat. 1941 prior to amendment.
- Sec. 693.03, Fa. Stat. 1941 as amended by Laws 1943 c. 21746
par. 1-3.
1 Berlin v. Jacobs (Fla.) 24 So. (2d) 717 (1946).
*

'
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because of the inhibitions of Sec. 708.07, Florida Statutes, 1941." The
Court held that this section had not been modified or superseded by
certain other sections of tile Florida Statutes," and then laid down the
doctrine that contracts to convey must "be executed and acknowledged
in the form prescribed for conveyances of real property," in order to be
specifically enforced."
The decision apparently completely ignores the provisions of the 1943
act with reference to married women's acknowledgments, though that
act by its terms makes such acknowledgments no "part of the execution
of any such instrument" and by its terms includes "contracts for the
sale of lands" in its provisions." The 1943 act specifically repealed all
laws in conflict with it,"' and it would seem that this provision should
serve to repeal the acknowledgment requirement of Sec. 708.07 since
that section was made a part of the law in 1892."
The Supreme Court has not chosen to take this position, and as a
result Berlin v. Jacobs destroys much of the usefulness of the 1943
acknowledgment act. While the opinion does not hold the contract
void, it denies the holder the right to enforce the same by court proceedings, and thereby reaches the same result.
As a consequence, a shadow is thrown over the entire provisions of
the 1943 act, and the coming legislature would (1o well to make such
amendments as are necessary to Sec. 708.07 and other sections of the
statutes to make them conform without possible question to the progressive spirit of the 1943 act.

THE GIFT TAX AND DIVORCE SETTLEMENTS
Few meii when making a transfer of property under a divorce
settlement feel that they are making a "gift". More often than not
they feel that they are meeting the hard terms of a closely-bargained
contract. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not interested,
however, in the transferor's subjective feelings in such a matter. He
Sec. 708.07, Fla. Stat. 1941: "Coverture shall not prevent a decree
against husband and wife to specifically perform their written agreement to sell or convey the separate property of the wife, or to relinquish
her right of dower in the property of the husband, but no agreement for
the sale or conveyance of her real property or for relinquishment of
dower, shall be specifically enforced unless it be executed and acknowledged in the form prescribed for conveyances of her real property and
for relinquishment of dower."
11 See. 708.08, 708.09, 708,10, Fla. Stat. 1941 as amended by Laws 1943
c. 21932 and 21696.
Berlin v. Jacobs, supra., p. 718.
Sec. 693.03, Fla. Stat. 1941 as amended by Laws 194,3 c. 21746
par. 1-3. ef. Note 1.
"
Laws 1943, c. 21746, sec. 3.
22 Rev. Stat. 1892, see. 2076.

